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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664
Drug agents investigated the purchase of chemicals to make illegal
drugs. A witness told the agents that the individuals they sought were
on a houseboat. After observing activity that looked like drug manufacturing, the agents boarded the boat. They arrested Hill and Pemberton,
conducted a cursory search, and found an amphetamine laboratory.
The agents secured the boat and then obtained a search warrant. Hill
and Pemberton claimed that their arrests were unlawful and that the evidence seized should be suppressed. The Tenth Circuit held that the
agents had probable cause to arrest the two men. The court also held
that the houseboat was not considered a home; therefore, the requirement that a warrant be obtained before making a nonconsensual entry
into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest was not applicable.
The court concluded that the boat was more like a vehicle than a house.
Specht v. Jensen, 837 F.2d 940
In an en banc rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed an earlier
panel opinion. The rehearing was limited to the issue of whether an
attorney could serve as an expert witness on the issue of illegal search
and seizure. This testimony had been allowed at the district court level,
and a jury verdict had been entered for the plaintiffs. A Tenth Circuit
panel had reversed on the grounds that F.R.E. 702 would not permit an
attorney called as an expert witness to state his views on the law governing a case, and then give his opinioin as to whether the defendant's
conduct violated that law. Affirmed.
The court of appeals agreed with the panel opinion that this expert
testimony encroached upon the court's authority to instruct the jury and
that it was prejudicial enough to warrant reversal.
United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268
Appellant Aquino appeals his conviction on illegal possession of a
firearm. Affirmed.
Aquino's conviction was secured using evidence discovered in his
home in the course of a warrantless search. The court of appeals held
that the search was proper, since the facts indicated that the government
had ample probable cause, and there was a high likelihood of evidence
being destroyed if police action was delayed.
United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103
Appeal of the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress
evidence seized and statements made when appellant was stopped at an
airport by two police officers.
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Two officers were at the airport following a tip they had received
when one officer recognized appellant from a previous arrest. Believing
appellant had violated the conditions of his pretrial release, the officer
decided to stop and question appellant. When appellant's name was
called out, appellant quickened his pace at which point the officers physically stopped and detained him and conducted a search.
Under New Mexico law, while the court could have had appellant
arrested for violation of conditions of pretrial release, such a violation
was not a crime and thus did not provide a basis, for stopping defendant. At most, the officer should have reported seeing the appellant at
the airport.
The Tenth Circuit found that the pat-down search for weapons was
not supported by reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and
presently dangerous inasmuch as he had just passed airport security detectors to gain entry to the gate area. Additionally, the actions of the
officer exceeded the scope of a permissible frisk for weapons under the
Terry exception, where an officer went beyond patting defendant's outer
clothing and reached into his pockets. This conduct cannot be considered minimally intrusive.
The Tenth Circuit remanded with directions to grant appellant's
motion to suppress.
Goichman v. City of Aspen, 859 F.2d 1466
While the appellant was in Aspen as a tourist, his car was towed and
impounded for a parking violation. Appellant paid the fine and the towing fee but filed suit against the city. He alleged that he had been deprived of personal property without a judicial hearing, prior to the
payment of the fines, to determine the legal justification for the seizure
and impoundment of his car. The district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the reasonable availability
of a hearing to adjudicate the underlying parking violation satisfied due
process. Consequently, no additional hearing, judicial or otherwise, was
necessary to determine the validity of Aspen's impoundment and towing
procedures.
Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999
Jim Floyd allowed private security agents at the Denver airport to
search his duffel bag. When the agents found large amounts of money,
they alerted the police who escorted petitioner to an airport security office. The bag was searched again, this time without petitioner's consent,
and a trained dog was summoned to test the bag for drugs. Floyd denied ownership of the bag and left the airport. When the dog reacted to
the presence of drugs in the bag, the money was turned over to federal
agents. Floyd filed a motion for return of the money under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41(e). The government moved to dismiss the
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Rule 41(e) motion, but the government motion was denied. The government initiated forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881. The
lower court, however, found that the money had been illegally seized
and ordered it returned. The government appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that in
order for Floyd to prevail on a Rule 41 (e) motion, he must show that he
has no adequate remedy at law and that irreparable injury would result
to him if he were denied the motion. Even though the evidence supported the lower court's finding that Floyd had no adequate remedy at
law, there was reversible error by the lower court in that it did not also
require a showing by Floyd that irreparable harm would result from dismissal of his motion.

